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Standard economic theory has specific predictions about how consumers will respond to 
changes in disposable income.  For example, the response of consumers will depend on 
whether the changes are expected or unexpected, and on whether they are temporary or 
permanent.  When the change in disposable income arises from a change in tax policy, 
the theory predicts that consumer responses also depend on whether they perceive the 
changes in taxes to be accompanied by changes in government spending.   
This paper advances survey techniques to estimate the marginal propensity to 
consume.  In July through September 2001, many households received tax rebates of 
$300 or $600.  These rebates were advance payments of the tax reduction associated with 
the creation of the new, 10 percent income tax bracket.  We conducted a survey of a 
representative sample of U.S. households during August, September, and October 2001 
to determine how the receipt of the rebate checks would change behavior.  We find that 
only 22 percent of those receiving the rebate reported that it would lead them to mostly 
increase spending.  This propensity to spend is remarkably low, both from a theoretical 
prospective and when compared to previous estimates.   
 The propensity to consume from a permanent tax cut should, in the standard 
model, be close to one.  Moreover, households that are liquidity constrained 
would consume at a high rate even if they perceive the tax cut to be less than 
permanent.   
 Previous estimates of the propensity to consume, either from aggregate or 
individual data, generally point to a much higher propensity to consume.    2
Hence, the evidence from the consumer response to the 2001 tax rebate represents a sharp 
break with previous evidence.  The time-series evidence suggests a propensity to 
consume of about one-half even from expected changes in income.  The cross-sectional 
evidence is more varied, but even for changes in income where theory would suggest a 
propensity to consume of close to zero, the evidence typically suggests a high propensity 
to consume.   
The lower propensity to consume we find cannot be attributed to our survey 
methodology.  In 1992, we fielded a similar survey question to measure the propensity to 
consume from the 1992 changes in income tax withholding.  Both the 1992 and 2001 
survey questions were included as modules on the University of Michigan Survey 
Research Center’s monthly Survey of Consumers, so the procedures for drawing the 
sample were the same in both surveys.  For the 1992 withholding change, we found that 
over forty percent of households would spend the extra current income from the 
reduction in withholding, despite the fact that the increase in take-home pay would be 
offset by either a lower tax refund or higher final payment.  While that behavior is 
inconsistent with unconstrained optimization, it is quite consistent with the broad range 
of evidence that a high fraction of income goes to households who act myopically or 
liquidity constrained with respect to changes in income.  Because the methodology used 
to study the 2001 rebate so closely mirrors that of the 1992 study, the surprising results of 
the 2001 study appear to represent a genuine departure from past behavior and are not an 
artifact of our methodology or the specific details of the survey. 
Whether consumers behave according to the standard theory has substantial 
implications for both the understanding of economic fluctuations and for predictions  3
about the likely impact of changes in government policy.  If consumers are foresighted 
and unconstrained, their spending behavior may either damp or magnify the response to a 
current shock to income depending on the relationship of the income shock to changes in 
future income.   
There are a number of reasons why households might not increase spending from 
a putatively permanent tax rebate.  They might not believe that it is permanent, or they 
might believe that it would be offset by some other government action (e.g., a cut in a 
benefit or a future increase of another tax).  In designing the survey, we included 
questions to shed light on these hypotheses.  Moreover, there is a substantial degree of 
heterogeneity in consumer behavior.  Again, the survey is designed to elicit information 
to systematically account for this heterogeneity.  A strength of the survey methodology is 
that it allows direct tests of hypotheses that might account for the behavior. 
The present study is intended to extend our understanding of consumer response 
to fiscal interventions.  One goal is simply to assess the extent to which the rebate 
induced consumers to spend more than they otherwise would have, on what kinds of 
goods, and over what time periods.  An equally important objective is to test various 
hypotheses about what motivates the variation in behavioral response to the rebate, and to 
discriminate among reasonable alternative explanations.  For example, a taxpayer who 
does not increase spending upon receiving the check may do so because of a Ricardian 
belief that it signals no increase in their well-being.  Alternatively, someone who 
increases spending upon receiving the check may do so because he or she is liquidity 
constrained or because the new tax law, of which the rebate is a small part, implies a 
large increase in permanent after-tax income.    4
The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows.  Section I describes the 
change in tax policy in 2001.  Section II gives details of the survey.  Section III presents 
the results.  Section IV surveys the literature on propensity to consume in the context of 
these results.  Section V presents our conclusions. 
 
I.  The Policy 
 
On May 25, 2001, the congressional conference committee approved the Economic 
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001.  President George W. Bush signed 
the bill into law on June 7, 2001.  Under the bill, taxpayers were entitled to a credit in tax 
year 2001 up to $300 for single individuals and up to $600 in the case of a married couple 
filing a joint return.  Most taxpayers received this credit in the form of a check issued by 
the Department of the Treasury.  These checks were sent out beginning the week of July 
23, 2001 and continued until the week of September 24, 2001.  Those taxpayers who as 
of these dates had not filed their 2000 tax return did not receive the check until the IRS 
had processed the 2000 return.  These payments were commonly referred to as tax 
rebates, although the IRS referred to them as advance payments of a 2001 tax credit. 
The tax rebates were substantial, both from the point of view of the representative 
household or in aggregate.  They amounted to $38 billion, or approximately 0.4 percent 
of annual GDP.  Median family income in 2000 was about $41,000, so a $600 rebate 
represents about 1.5 percent of median annual income and a greater share of disposable 
income for the typical household.  Because the size of the rebate is capped, it declines as 
a fraction of income as income rises once a family receives the maximum rebate.  
The rebates are a small part of the overall tax package, although the most 
significant part of the tax cuts implemented in 2001.  The official revenue estimate  5
produced by the Joint Committee on Taxation put the cost over 11 years at $1.349 
trillion.  In terms of revenue impact, the largest component was a phased-in reduction in 
all of the marginal tax rates.  By 2006, the top 39.6 percent bracket would be 35 percent, 
the 36 percent bracket would be 33 percent, the 31 percent bracket would be 28 percent, 
and the 28 percent bracket would be 25 percent.  The new law also included such items as 
a phase-out of limitations on itemized deductions and restrictions on personal 
exemptions, an expansion of the child and dependent care tax credits, and an increase in 
the standard deduction for married couples.  The estate and gift tax exemption levels 
were gradually increased and the rate structure gradually lowered, leading to a complete 
abolition of the estate tax in 2010.
1  Clearly, high-income households and those with 
large estates had future taxes reduced by substantially more than the amount of the 
rebate. 
The rebate corresponds to a new 10 percent income tax bracket for a portion of 
taxable income that was previously taxed at 15 percent, effective for taxable years 
beginning January 1, 2001.  The 10 percent bracket applied to the first $6,000 of taxable 
income for single individuals, $10,000 of taxable income for heads of household, and 
$12,000 for married couples filing joint returns.  The tax rebate scheme was designed to 
deliver the benefit of the new 10 percent income tax rate in a highly visible way during 
calendar year 2001.  Thus, the maximum rebate for a married couple filing jointly was 5 
percent of $12,000, or $600.  The rebates for taxpayers with other marital status were 
calculated in the same manner. 
                                                 
1 Strikingly, both the income tax and the state tax were designed to sunset, i.e., return to 
pre-2001 law, after December 31, 2010.  6
Although the rebate was an advance credit for a reduction in tax year 2001 tax 
liability, its amount was calculated on the basis of taxable income in tax year 2000.  In 
the case of taxpayers who would have received a lower credit based on actual taxable 
income in 2001, the difference was forgiven, and no reconciliation was required.  Those 
taxpayers who were entitled to receive a larger rebate on the basis of actual 2001 taxable 
income could claim it when they filed their 2001 tax year return in calendar year 2002. 
Beginning in mid-July, the Treasury sent out notices to families informing of the 
amount of their rebate and providing documentation to be used in filing 2001 tax returns.  
The actual checks were mailed over 10 weeks, from the weeks of July 23 to September 
24.  Which week a taxpayer received the check depended on the second to last digit of the 
Social Security number.
2  The Treasury calculated that 92 million taxpayers would get a 
rebate check, with 72 million receiving the full amount, and the rebate checks totaling 
$38 billion.  
 
                                                 
2 In addition, a one percentage point reduction in the 28, 31, 36, and 39.6 percent brackets 
was effective on July 1, 2001.  Starting at that time, the standard amount of employer 
withholding was reduced for taxpayers at the (new) 27 percent bracket and above.  (Tax 
liabilities were reduced effective January 1, 2001 by reducing the 28 percent rates and 
above by 0.5 percentage point.)  For a married couple with two exemptions, this 
withholding bracket was reached at $55,700 of annual payroll income.  See Internal 
Revenue Service (2001).  For income above that threshold, withholding was reduced by 1 
percent of income beginning in July 1. Annual household income of about $56,000 is 
about at the 63rd percentile of the income distribution.  See U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
Census 2000 Supplementary Survey Summary Table P069 (download from Census 
Bureau WWW site).  Thus, for most households withholding was not changed.  For all 
but the highest-income households, the decrease in withholding in 2001 was low relative 
to the rebate.  For example, a married couple would have to have an annual payroll 
income of about $175,000 in order for the change in withholding over the last six months 
of 2001 to be $600, the usual size of the tax rebate check.  Hence, the receipt of the 
rebates was confounded by a change in withholding, but this change was significant only 
for a few high-income households.  7
II.  Survey Methodology 
In this paper, we study consumers’ response to the income tax rebates of 2001.  We 
conducted a survey of a representative sample of households to measure whether or not 
they would spend the rebate.  Our survey instrument was a rider on the University of 
Michigan Survey Research Center’s Monthly Survey, also known as the Survey of 
Consumers.  The survey’s core content contains questions about expectations of 
economy-wide and family economic circumstances that are the basis of the Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment Index.  The expectations components of the sentiment index can be 
used to test for liquidity constraints as an explanation of the pattern of spending.  
Additionally, we designed questions to shed light on specific economic or behavioral 
hypotheses that could explain the pattern of consumer response.  Hence, the survey 
approach promises not only to quantify the response of spending to a change in income, 
but also to provide evidence on the underlying behavior that drives the spending 
response. 
The Monthly Survey provides a representative sample of households in the 
contiguous 48 U.S. states and the District of Columbia.  It is conducted by telephone 
throughout the month.  The Monthly Survey begins with core questions used to construct 
the Consumer Sentiment Index.  The core content is followed by several modules 
concerning spending and finances.  The tax cut module immediately followed the core 
content.  The Monthly Survey concludes with some questions about household 
demographics. 
Our survey was conducted in August, September, and October 2001.  The first 
two months of data were collected while households were in the midst of receiving rebate  8
checks.  By October, most households entitled to checks should have received them.  The 
Monthly Survey provides both a representative sample of adult individuals and of 
households.  We use the weights that enable us to construct a representative sample of 
households.  These weights correct, among other things, for the over-sampling of 
households with more than one telephone line.  They also exclude responses by adult 
children residing with their parents on the grounds that these respondents are uninformed 
about their families’ finances.  See Richard Curtin (no date). 
The tax rebate survey module begins by briefly summarizing the policy and the 
rebate.   The survey then asks whether the household will spend the rebate, save it, or use 
it to pay debt.  Specifically, the key question was as follows: 
 
Earlier this year a Federal law was passed cutting income tax rates and 
expanding certain credits and deductions.  The tax cuts will be phased in 
over the next ten years.  This year many households will receive a tax 
rebate check in the mail.  In most cases, the tax rebate will be $300 for 
single individuals and $600 for married couples. 
 
Thinking about your (family’s) financial situation this year, will the tax 
rebate lead you mostly to increase spending, mostly to increase saving, or 
mostly to pay off debt? 
 
 Respondents are allowed to volunteer that they will not receive the rebate, although they 
are not prompted for that response.  (This is question A31 of the survey.  See the  9
Appendix for the exact wording and order of the survey questions.)  This question closely 
follows that used by Shapiro and Slemrod (1995) to study the 1992 change in 
withholding.
3  
The remainder of the survey module was designed to elicit responses that would 
be useful for testing various theories that explain spending behavior.  These questions 
were designed within the limits of a telephone survey of the general public.  There are 
limits—owing to survey costs, the attention span of respondents for a particular question, 
and the willingness of respondents to complete the whole survey—on the number of 
questions and the length of explanatory material.  Moreover, it is necessary to map as 
best as possible economic concepts into everyday terms.  Because the framing of 
questions may have an effect on responses, we attempted to design questions that would 
give unbiased responses. 
The next question (A32) was designed to elicit (for those who said they would 
spend the rebate) whether it was for a particular purchase (a durable for example, but also 
a lumpy non-durable such as a trip) or for non-durables.  This question illustrates issues 
that need to be confronted in crafting the survey.  Terms such as “durable” or “lumpy” 
have technical meaning to economists, but are not necessarily meaningful to respondents.  
Of course, using non-technical terms in the survey leads to questions of interpretation 
                                                 
3 The 1992 question was as follows:  “The federal government has recently changed the 
amount of income tax that is being withheld from paychecks.  On average, the change in 
withholding should increase your take-home pay by about $25 per month, or by a total of 
about $250 for all of 1992.  It also means that next year your tax refund will be about 
$250 less than otherwise, or you will have to pay about $250 more in taxes next year than 
otherwise.  How do you think you will use the extra $25 per month—do you think you 
will spend most of it, save most of it, use most of it to repay debts, or what?”    10
when analyzing the responses.  We settled on “particular item” and “day-to-day 
expenses” to describe these alternatives. 
The next questions are relatively straightforward queries about the timing of the 
receipt of the rebate and timing of spending.  (See A33, A34, and A36.  A35 is an 
interviewer checkpoint.)  Question A37 asks whether the household expects larger, 
similar, or smaller tax cuts in future years compared to the rebate.  This information is 
critical for testing standard theories of consumption behavior.  If future, credible, tax cuts 
are at least the size of the rebate, then the permanent income model of consumption 
would warrant an increase in consumption that could be at least the size of the rebate.  
Under the 2001 tax law, the median household will indeed get a tax cut in future years 
that is, in nominal dollars, exactly the size of the rebate.
4   Many high-income households 
will get substantially larger tax cuts.  This question also allows us to compare the 
respondents’ prediction about their future tax cuts to an estimate of the cuts based on 
their economic and demographic circumstances.  Behavior could differ from the 
permanent income model because respondents perceive the tax cuts to be short-lived. 
The Barro/Ricardo hypothesis is that households will integrate the governments’ 
budget constraint into their own decision-making, and therefore treat a tax cut as an 
increase in lifetime resources only if it is matched by a cut in government spending.  
Question A42 asks whether respondents think that the tax legislation as a whole will 
increase or decrease government spending.  The responses to this question can be used to 
                                                 
4 To get a larger tax cut, households will have to reach the income level of the old 28 
percent bracket, which as noted above is reached at well above the median level of 
income.  To get a smaller tax cut, the individual would have to have a decline in income 
and have a level of income lower than that of the new 10 percent bracket ($12,000 of 
taxable income for a family).  The tax cuts are scheduled to disappear in 2011.  11
examine whether the Barro/Ricardo hypothesis accounts for the decision to spend the 
rebate.  The next question (A43) asks whether the tax legislation would improve the 
family’s personal financial situation over the next ten years.   This question is designed to 
elicit the respondent’s expectation about the permanent impact of the tax cut, potentially 
including the changes in government spending asked about in the previous question.
5 
 The survey also includes questions to explore alternative theories of spending 
behavior.  In particular, we were interested in testing for the importance of rule-of-thumb 
behavior in spending or saving the rebate.  Designing questions that elicited meaningful 
information about such behavioral considerations proved a challenge.  One cannot ask 
“Into what mental account did you deposit your rebate?” or “Did you add the rebate to 
your buffer stock? or “Do you have a spending or saving rule of thumb?”  Our approach 
to elicit information about the procedures respondents used in forming their spending 
plans was first to ask whether the family had a budget (A38) and then to ask whether the 
budget had a spending target, a saving target, or a debt repayment target (A39).  (Multiple 
answers were accepted, but not prompted for.)  The specific aim of this question is to see 
if a budgetary rule of thumb could account for variations in consumer response to the 
rebate.  One rule of thumb is to set expenditures and let blips in income add or subtract to 
cash balances or, more generally, savings.  Another is to save a specific amount of 
periodic income (e.g., through a payroll savings plan) and spend the rest.  The first rule of 
thumb leads to saving an infusion of income while the second leads to spending it.  
Neither involves high-frequency reoptimization of spending versus saving decisions.  
                                                 
5 These questions, together with Question A41 that asks about the impact of the rebate on 
the economy, are grouped together at the end of the survey module.  We grouped together 
the questions that bear on the overall impact of the policy.  12
Either could be near-rational, depending on the process followed by shocks to income 
and consumption. 
Finally, we asked how the respondent financed a hypothetical shock to 
consumption needs, specifically whether he or she would finance a major, unexpected car 
repair by using savings, by cutting back other expenses, or by borrowing (A40).   Cutting 
back other spending could indicate liquidity constraints for individuals with little assets.  
For individuals with assets, cutting back spending might be interpreted as due to mental 
accounting or spending targets. 
 
III.  Results 
 
A.  Tabular Analysis 
 
Of those that had already received or expected to receive the rebate, only 21.3 percent of 
survey respondents said they had or would mostly spend more because of the rebate 
check.  When the responses are weighted as described in Section II, this figure rises 
slightly to 21.8 percent.  All subsequent figures in the paper refer to weighted responses.  
(The counts of weighted responses in the tables are rounded to the nearest integer.  The 
percentages are based on unrounded data.)  Of those who would not spend, 59 percent 
said they would repay debt and 41 percent said they would devote the rebate to increased 
saving.  
The 21.8 percent figure is far below the percentage that reported spending most of 
the increased after-tax income from the elder Bush’s withholding change, and well below 
what most other research would suggest.  It is in line, though, with what some other 
commercial surveys had suggested prior to the rebate program, although the wording of 
the question always differed.  For example, in a Gallup Poll released on July 24, 2001, 17  13
percent of those surveyed said they would spend the tax rebate, 32 percent said they 
would save or invest it, and 47 percent said they would use it to pay off bills. 
Table 2 begins our investigation of what explains differences in spending 
propensities across households by displaying the responses by the level of income and the 
value of stocks owned.
 6  The spending fraction shows no trend within the bottom three 
income groups.  It is higher for the top two income groups.  Hence, the commonly 
expressed view that lower-income individuals have relative high propensity to spend (see 
Paul Krugman, New York Times, October 24, 2001) is not supported by our findings.  
Finally, not surprisingly, Table 2 reveals that low-income households were much more 
likely than higher-income households to expect not to receive the rebate. 
The relationship of the consumer response to the tax rebate and stock ownership 
is strikingly non-monotonic.  Among the slight majority of respondents that own no 
stock, 20.4 percent say they will spend it.  Among those who do have a small amount of 
stock, the spending percentage is lower than for non-stockholders, but it is higher for 
those with more than $50,000 of stock.  This pattern can be rationalized as follows.  Non-
stockholders tend not to be savers, while stockholders are savers.   (See Mankiw, 2000, 
for the spender/saver dichotomy.)  Those stockholders with low wealth are trying to build 
wealth and therefore have a powerful saving motive; those with higher wealth may 
already have adequate assets, and therefore are spenders on the margin. 
To the extent that income is a (negative) indicator of the presence of liquidity 
constraints, the results of Table 2 are counter-indicative.  Those people who are more 
                                                 
6 High stockholding is not a sufficient statistic for high wealth.  Many high-wealth 
individuals do not hold stock.  See Mankiw and Zeldes (1991).  We focus on stock 
holdings simply because these are the only data on wealth in the survey.  14
likely to be constrained (i.e., have lower income) are those that are more likely to mostly 
save, rather than mostly spend, the rebate.  Table 3A pursues this explanation by cross-
tabulating the spend-or-save responses with the answers to three questions designed to 
pick up the presence of liquidity constraints.  We believe that a person is more likely to 
be liquidity constrained if he or she is financially worse off compared to the previous 
year, is financially worse off compared to what is expected for next year, or if they expect 
higher income next year.  In none of these three cases is there a relationship between the 
answer to this question and the answer to the spend-or-save question that would indicate 
the importance of liquidity constraints.  In fact, to the extent that any patterns emerge, 
they run in the reverse direction.  People who are in worse financial condition than last 
year are less likely to spend more because of the rebate.  The most surprising pattern of 
results applies to the question about this year’s financial condition compared to what is 
expected next year.  Here the relationship to spend-save plans is non-monotonic.  The 
least likely to spend are those who expect to be worse off.  That finding in and of itself is 
consistent with the liquidity constraint story.  But the group second most likely to spend 
are those who expect to be better off next year, while the group most likely to spend are 
those who expect to be about as financially well off next year as this year.  The liquidity 
constraint story suggests that the most likely to spend would be those who expect to be 
better off next year.  The same pattern of results appears when the question asks about 
income next year rather than financial condition next year compared to this year. 
Table 3B uses the joint distribution of retrospective and expected financial 
condition to provide a more powerful test of the liquidity constraint hypothesis.  For 
example, if liquidity is a key determinant of spending behavior, households who are  15
temporarily in bad financial condition (worse off than last year, but expecting to be better 
of next year) should have particularly high spending rates.  In contrast, those who are in 
temporarily good financial condition (better off than last year, but expecting to be worse 
off next year) should have particularly low spending rates.  Households in temporarily 
bad financial condition have a spending fraction of 16.0 percent, while those in 
temporarily good financial condition have a spending fraction of 22.0 percent.  The 
liquidity constraint hypothesis predicts the opposite pattern.  Under the liquidity 
constraint hypothesis, one would expect higher spending rates as one reads down the 
columns of Table 3B and lower rates as one reads across.  These patterns are not apparent 
in the results. 
 In our previous survey-based study of the elder Bush’s withholding change, we 
were also unable to relate spend-save intentions with any indicator of liquidity constraint, 
and we speculated that the explanation might be related to whether people used budget 
rules, or rules of thumb, to govern their behavior.  Thaler (1990) argues that such rules of 
thumb, or mental accounts, are important for understanding specific decisions by 
consumers.  Mankiw (2000) suggests that a behavioral dichotomy between spenders and 
savers is useful for understanding aggregate behavior and the effects of fiscal policy.  Our 
questions about budgeting are an attempt to quantify such behavior.    
The set of five questions detailed in Table 4 was designed to further investigate 
these hypotheses.  About two-thirds of households report having a budget.  Those who 
have budgets are slightly more likely to spend the rebate, though not statistically 
significantly so.  Among households who have a budget, those who target spending are 
more likely to spend the rebate, those who target debt repayment are less likely to spend,  16
and those who target saving are intermediate.  (The survey allowed multiple targets to be 
mentioned, so the target categories are not mutually exclusive.)  These findings are 
different that what one might have expected from an economic model of targeting, in 
which a household that spends a routine amount would save residual income and vice 
versa.  The survey evidence is the opposite:  target spenders tend to spend on the margin 
and target debt payers tend to save on the margin.  There is no substantial difference in 
spending rates for target savers. 
We included a question on the survey asking how a hypothetical unexpected, 
nonrecurring expense would be financed.  The last group of results in Table 4 shows that 
those who would use saving to finance the expense are more likely to spend the rebate 
than those who would cut other spending or use credit.  Those who would cut back 
spending for the unexpected expense might be liquidity constrained.  If so, then one 
would have expected a high spending rate from the rebate for this group.  Again, the 
liquidity hypothesis is rejected.  Both those who would use saving or use credit for the 
unexpected expense are smoothing consumption, yet they spend the rebate at different 
rates.  
Table 5 provides information about the relationship between spend-or-save plans 
and the respondents’ outlook for the economy and fiscal policy.  The first set of results 
relates the expected size of the tax cut to spending.  Very few respondents expect to 
receive larger tax cuts, though those who do so do not have particularly high spending.  
As discussed in Section II, the tax rebate corresponds to the tax savings from the new 10 
percent bracket, currently legislated to be in place for ten years.  For most households, the 
only tax cut received from the 2001 legislation will be this rate cut.  To get the benefit of  17
the phased-in rate cuts on the higher brackets, taxable income will have to reach the level 
of the former 28 percent bracket.  Hence, presuming the current legislation stays in place, 
the future benefit depends on expected future income.  Since the higher tax brackets 
apply only to levels of income well above the median, most respondents should expect to 
receive future tax cuts no larger than their rebate under the 2001 tax law.  Moreover, 
there is uncertainty about whether the currently legislated rate reductions will be the 
future law. 
Table 6 takes a closer look at the expected size of the tax cut and its relationship 
to spending.  It shows the fraction mostly spending the rebate by two objective indicators 
of the size of expected future tax cuts: current income level and expectations of future 
financial condition.  (The expectation variable is for the next year.  Though it does not 
capture fully the long-run outlook, it does control for whether current income is high or 
low relative to the future.)  The first three rows of each cell show the fraction of 
respondents expecting a larger, same, or lower tax cut.  We know from Table 5 that only 
a small fraction of respondents expects a larger tax in the future.  Reading across columns 
of Table 6 shows that households that expect their financial condition to worsen generally 
expect smaller future tax cuts; the pattern is clearest for the middle three income groups.  
Reading down the panels shows that households that have higher income generally 
expect larger future tax cuts.  Both these findings accord with current law.  Yet, even of 
those households with high and rising income that are very likely to see higher tax cuts in 
the future, only a fairly low fraction—at most 0.31—say they expect a larger tax cut.  
Hence, either they misperceive the current law or expect it to be changed.  In either case,  18
this pessimism about future tax cuts might explain the low spending propensity from the 
current rebate.  
Returning to Table 5, the second panel shows that most households expect the tax 
legislation to have no effect on their overall personal finances over the next decade.  The 
third panel shows that most households are equally pessimistic about the prospects for the 
tax cut improving short-run economic performance.  There is also no statistically 
significant relationship between these expectations and the propensity to spend more 
because of the rebate. 
The bottom panel of Table 5 investigates the role of expectations of future 
government spending.  Under the Barro/Ricardo hypothesis, households should not spend 
their rebate unless the tax cut is accompanied by a cut in government spending.  Only 19 
percent of households expect that a cut in government spending will accompany the tax 
cuts.  This expectation could help explain why, on average, the propensity to spend the 
tax rebate is low.  Yet in the cross-section, there is little support for the Barro/Ricardo 
hypothesis because the spending propensity has no significant relationship with 
expectations of future government spending. 
Table 7 shows some details about the spending plans of those who expected to 
spend the rebate.  About 40 percent reported planning to spend the rebate on a particular 
item versus 60 percent for day-to-day expenses.   Recall that we meant these categories to 
contrast durables or other lumpy items with nondurables.  The next panel considers the  19
timing of spending.  More than three-quarters of the respondents expected to spend the 
rebate within a month and few planned to defer it to 2002.
7 
B.  Timing of the Survey and Timing of Receipt of the Rebate 
The attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 occurred during the 
data collection period of the survey.  The Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index had 
already fallen in the early part of September prior to the attack.  It bounced up somewhat 
after the attack, although it ended the month at a much lower level than at the beginning 
of the month.  Did the attack have an effect on spending the rebate?  Table 8A appears to 
suggest that it did.  For those who responded to the survey prior to September 11, 18.4 
percent said they would spend the rebate.  After September 11, the spending rate 
increased to 25.1 percent.  
Interpreting the effect of singular events, even ones as significant as the attack, 
can be misleading.  The change in the spending propensity following the attack might, by 
coincidence, arise from some other factor.  The next panel in Table 8A shows such a 
confounding factor.  There is a substantial and statistically significant impact of having 
already received the rebate on whether a respondent reports planning to spend it.  There 
are a variety of reasons why a higher spending rate might be reported for those who have 
the rebate in hand.  The rebate might be more salient if it is hand, though it is not clear 
why salience would favor spending over saving.  Another possibility is that receiving the 
rebate confirms that the household is entitled to it and hence can add it to its lifetime 
resources available for spending.  Having received the rebate has a large effect on 
                                                 
7 The survey question refers to the lag in spending from the time of survey.  The lag in 
spending from receipt of the rebate needs to be adjusted up or down depending on 
whether the rebate had been received at the time of the survey.  20
spending, though it does not appear to matter whether the rebate was received very 
recently or not. 
Table 8B shows how timing of survey responses and timing of receipt of the 
rebate are confounded. During August, the first month of survey, relatively few 
households had received the rebate.  By September, the majority had received it.  By 
October, the overwhelming majority reported having received it.   
To sort out these effects, we use a regression analysis.  Table 9 reports the results 
of estimating a linear probability model for the propensity to spend the rebate.
8  In 
column (A), the coefficient of the post-attack dummy is 6.7 percentage points and is 
statistically significant.  Column (B) shows, however, that all the incremental spending 
comes from people interviewed in October.  Distinguishing pre- and post-attack 
September in Column (C) does not change the conclusion that high spending is 
associated with being surveyed in October, which happens to be after the attack.   
Of course, by October, most respondents had received the rebate.  Column (D) includes 
controls for having received the rebate.  The estimated coefficients of having received the 
rebate are sizeable and jointly significant.  Moreover, including the dummies for receipt 
of the rebate makes the October coefficient shrink and become insignificant.  The 
September coefficient gets larger in absolute value, but remains insignificant.  The post-
attack variable has a small and insignificant estimated coefficient. 
                                                 
8 The dependent variable in these regressions equals one for those who reported mostly 
spending the rebate and zero for those who report saving or paying debt.  An alternative 
would be to estimate a probit model.  But recall that we argued above that the data should 
be weighted.  Weighting induces heteroskedasticity and therefore renders the probit 
analysis inconsistent.  Hence, we estimate linear probability models and use 
heteroskedastic standard errors for inference.  21
Although the pattern of coefficients on the three receipt dummy variables might 
suggest a decay, the difference is not statistically significant (p=0.34).  Moreover, 
although the month dummies have small t-statistics, they are marginally significant 
jointly (p=0.10).  In Column (E) we thus present results including the month dummies 
and including a single dummy for having received the rebate regardless of timing of 
receipt.  This is our preferred specification, and it strongly suggests that having already 
received the check increases the probability of responding that it would be mostly spent 
by nearly 8 percentage points.  The last column shows the estimate of the effect on 
spending of having received the rebate leaving out the month controls—more than 9 
percentage points.  Given the marginal significance of the month dummies, this probably 
overstates the effect of receipt of the rebate. 
About 60 percent of respondents reported receiving the rebate at the time of the 
survey.  According to Column (E), receipt of the rebate adds 7.9 percentage points to the 
spending rate.  Hence, one might add 3.2 percentage points (.4 x 7.9) to the spending rate 
to correct for the effect of ultimate receipt of the rebate on those who had not received it 
at the time of the survey.  This would increase the estimated spending rate from 21.8 
percent to 25.0 percent.   
This analysis demonstrates the utility of the survey approach.  The effect of 
receipt of the rebate is confounded with the effect of the attack.  Our ability to control for 
receipt of the rebate among individuals responding to the survey after the attack allows us 
to avoid the incorrect inference that the attack changed spending.  In contrast, a 
researcher with only aggregate time series might well have concluded that the effect of 
the attack was significant.    22
The next section presents a more complete econometric analysis of the 
determinants of spending the rebate.  In light of the results in Table 9, we include controls 
for the month of survey and the receipt of the rebate in these equations. 
C.  Econometric Analysis 
 
The cross-tabulations suggest that the propensity for the rebate to increase spending is 
higher for those with higher incomes, is higher for those with more stock market wealth 
(although also relatively high for non-stockholders), but is not associated with indicators 
of liquidity constraints or how the tax cut legislation affected people’s long-run financial 
position.  It is correlated with budget rules, but not in a way that one would expect.  In 
this section we further explore the determinants of the spend-or-save response with a set 
of regression analyses.  In the analysis, we pool the save response with the repay debt 
response and contrast it with the spend response. 
The main advantage of this approach is that we can investigate whether the simple 
correlations revealed in the cross-tabulations may be picking up, or masking, an 
association with a correlated variable.  For example, Table 3 reveals that people who 
expect to be worse off next year are less likely to use the rebate as an opportunity to 
spend more.  But, if those who expect to be worse off are generally low-income, then it 
may be the association with income, rather than with expected future financial condition, 
that is driving the relationship with the spend-or-save response.    The regressions are 
estimated as linear probability models using the weighted data. 
As a baseline, Table 10 presents the results of a regression analysis with only log 
income, dummies for levels of stockholding (no stock is the excluded category), for the 
respondent being married, for the presence of children in the household, and for levels of  23
education of the respondent (less than high school is the omitted category).
9  Tables 11, 
12, and 13 focus additionally on each of the three sets of explanations of the spend-or-
save response: personal financial condition, budgeting, and the outlook for the economy 
and policy.   
The positive relationship with income found in Table 2 appears in Table 10 as 
well, although it remains statistically insignificant.  Relative to non-stockholding, 
spending is U-shaped in stockholding, as is found in Table 2.   
Being married raises the spending propensity and having children reduces it, 
although only with weak statistical significance.  The age pattern of the spending 
propensity is uneven, with the 50 to 64 year old respondents having lower spending 
propensities than younger (but not the youngest) and especially older households.  
Education is not significantly related to spending.  Since having children or the education 
levels have small and insignificant effects on spending, we drop them from subsequent 
regressions.  Column (B) reports the baseline regression without these covariates.  
Table 11 shows that the associations that run counter to the liquidity-constraints 
theory that appeared in Table 3 survive the regression framework.  Being better off, either 
compared to the previous year or the one’s expected condition next year, is positively 
associated with a propensity to spend.  Column (A) of Table 11 shows that being better 
off or in the same financial condition this year relative to last year raises the propensity to 
spend by 7.1 and 6.5 percentage points, respectively, relative to those who are worse off 
than last year.  Column (B) shows that expecting to be better off or in the same financial 
condition next year relative to this year raises the propensity to consume by 2.3 and 4.5 
                                                 
9 See Appendix Table 1 for definition of these variables and their means.  24
percentage points, respectively, relative to those who expect to be worse off next year 
than this year.  Combining both the retrospective and expected financial conditions in 
Column (C) has only a small effect on the estimates compared to those in Columns (A) 
and (B).  Hence, current financial conditions relative to the past and future conditions 
have a significant effect on spending, but not in the way one would expect if liquidity 
constraints explained behavior.  In particular, those with transitorily bad financial 
condition have about the same spending propensity as those with transitorily good 
financial conditions.  The highest spending propensities are associated with those that 
have a stable financial condition, retrospectively and going forward.   
The regression reported in Column (D) of Table 11 confirms that one’s expected 
financial condition has better predictive power for spending than expected income, as 
reported in the cross-tabulations of Table 3. 
Table 12 shows that whether or not the respondent has a budget is not a 
significant determinant of spending the rebate [Column (A)], but conditional on having a 
budget, those whose budget targets spending have a higher propensity to spend relative to 
other budget rules [Column (B)].  Taken at its face value, this result means that 
households abandon their budget rule on the margin, i.e., those who have a spending 
target are more likely to spend the rebate.  
Table 12, Column (C), provides further evidence that the cross-section differences 
in spending propensity are not well predicted by the standard model of consumption 
smoothing and liquidity constraints.  A liquidity constraint would require households 
facing an unexpected expense to cut back other spending.  For unconstrained households, 
using saving or using credit are both means of buffering consumption against shocks.   25
Yet, Table 4 shows and the regression in Column (C) of Table 12 confirms that in the 
survey responses, only those who would use saving as a buffer against an unexpected 
expense are particularly likely to spend the rebate.  The estimated coefficients of use 
credit and use saving are significantly different (p=0.01).  Hence, there is a striking 
asymmetry between those who buffer shocks with credit and with savings. 
Table 13 corroborates the impression gleaned from the cross-tabulations shown in 
Table 5 that neither budget rules nor beliefs about the impact of the tax cut legislation on 
one’s own, or the country’s, financial standing is montonically related to whether the 
consumer spends or saves the rebate.  Paradoxically, although not statistically 
significantly, those who believe that the tax cuts would worsen or improve their own 
personal financial situation were more likely to mostly spend the rebate compared to 
those who think it would have no effect; the same pattern is true with respect to how the 
tax cuts affect the overall economic situation. 
D.  Response to a Temporary Tax Cut After the Attack 
The University of Michigan Survey Research Center fielded a new survey, How America 
Responds, in response to the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. of September 
11, 2001.  The aim of the new survey was to study whether there were shifts in economic, 
social, political, and psychological attitudes following the attack.  The survey included a 
version of the question about tax rebates analyzed above.  It reads as follows: 
 
This year many households have received a tax rebate check in the mail 
amounting to $300 or $600.  Suppose the Federal government cut taxes an  26
additional $1000 per household for this year only and sent this $1000 
rebate to you (your family) in October of this year. 
 
Thinking about your (family’s) financial situation this year, will the tax 
rebate lead you mostly to increase spending, mostly to increase saving, or 
mostly to pay off debt? 
 
Respondents were then given the same “Spend,” “Save,” or “Pay Debt” alternatives as in 
the main question under study in this paper.  Hence, the question is identical except that 
the tax rebate is hypothetical, it is $1000 instead of $300 or $600, and it is received only 
in one year. 
The results are similar to this survey.  Only fifteen percent of the respondents 
answered that they would mostly spend the rebate.  The remainder was roughly equally 
split between saving and paying debt.  The spending rate for the hypothetical tax cut, like 
that for the actual rebate, was not a function of the level of income.  Given that the 
hypothetical rebate was temporary, a lower spending propensity can be rationalized by 
economic theory.  Nonetheless, the spending percentage is close to what we find for the 
actual rebate.  Like our estimate for the actual tax rebate, the spending propensity from 
the hypothetical rebate is much smaller than found in earlier studies. 
 
IV.  Literature on Propensity to Consume 
The standard methodological approach to this question has been to examine aggregate 
consumption data for signs of a break in behavior around the implementation date of a 
tax policy change.  This approach has been applied to the most similar recent policy, the  27
tax rebate of 1975.  The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 provided for a 10 percent rebate of 
1974 taxes up to a maximum of $200, and totaled $8.1 billion sent out from late April to 
mid-June of 1975.  The 1975 tax bill also included a smaller, transitory income tax 
reduction that was subsequently made permanent, and a one-time Social Security bonus 
for retirees with no income taxes to rebate.  Blinder (1981) finds that each rebate dollar 
raised consumption by about 16 cents in the quarter it was received, and still had 
substantial effects five to eight quarters afterwards.  Hence, the cumulative effect is 
substantially larger than the impact effect and substantially larger than we find.  
Modigliani and Steindel (1977) find much smaller effects, however, and Blinder and 
Deaton (1985) were unable to precisely estimate the response.  Poterba (1988), using 
monthly rather than quarterly consumption data, finds that consumption of nondurables 
increased by between 18 and 24 percent of the rebate in the month received, but found 
that the change in service consumption was negligible.  Hence, despite the fact that the 
1975 rebate was meant to be a temporary tax reduction, the time-series evidence suggest 
propensities to consume at least as great as we find, and substantially greater in the case 
of Blinder’s study. 
These aggregative studies focus on specific tax rebates as shocks to income.  The 
literature on the excess sensitivity of consumption to predictable changes in income 
examines how consumption responds on average to predetermined movements in 
income.
10 According to the permanent income model of consumption, consumption 
should adjust only when income moves unexpectedly.  These studies find, however, that 
                                                 
10 This line of research was begun by Flavin’s (1981) extension of Hall’s (1978) seminal 
work.  Though there are some econometric difficulties with Flavin’s approach [see  28
consumption responds to predictable changes in income.  The estimated aggregate 
propensity to consume from expected changes in income is between 40 and 50 percent. 
Similarly, there is a large literature on examining the excess reaction of 
consumption to income in data on households.
11  A series of recent studies have used data 
on individuals to examine how the receipt of payments affects spending.  The common 
thread of these studies is that consumption responds to changes in the timing of payments 
not associated with changes in lifetime resources.
12  Parker (1999) examines whether 
spending changes when take-home pay increases in months after wage earners hit the 
earnings ceiling for Social Security payroll taxes.  He finds that there is a correlation 
between take-home pay and consumption, although the evidence points to myopia or 
rule-of-thumb behavior rather than liquidity constraints as the source of the 
consumption/income correlation.  Souleles (1999) studies spending from tax refunds.  He 
concludes that almost two-thirds of every dollar of refund is spent within the quarter.  
Moreover, households that likely face liquidity constraints (those that are younger, have 
high debts, few liquid assets, and low income) quickly increase their spending on 
nondurables, while wealthier households quickly spend it on durable goods and may use 
part of the refund check later on summer vacations.  Stephens (2001) studies whether the 
receipt of Social Security checks affects the timing of spending within the month.  He 
finds a significant burst in spending in the week following receipt of the check.  Since the 
regularity of these payments provides ample opportunity for households to make 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mankiw and Shapiro (1985)], the finding of excess sensitivity has been confirmed by a 
large literature.  See Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and its successors.  
11 Hall and Mishkin (1982), Shapiro (1984), and Zeldes (1989) are early contributions.  
See Browning and Lusardi (1996) for a survey of this literature.   
12 Wilcox (1989, 1990) pioneered such studies in an aggregate time series settings.  29
adjustments to avoid the correlation of spending with the receipt of the check, Stephens’s 
finding suggests that some behavior other than liquidity constraints explains spending 
patterns. 
Not all evidence from individual households suggest excess consumption from 
predictable changes in income.  Hsieh (2001) finds that there is no evidence against 
consumption smoothing from changes in income from the large and predictable payments 
received by Alaskans from oil royalties.  Similarly, Souleles (2000) finds that large and 
predictable tuition payments have little impact on parents’ non-tuition expenditures.  
The most methodologically similar paper is Shapiro and Slemrod (1995), which 
used survey responses to estimate the consumption response to a policy of George W. 
Bush’s father.  President George H. Bush in 1992 issued an executive order that changed 
the income tax withholding rates to increase after-tax income by about $29 per month per 
worker, or an aggregate increase of $25 billion in after-tax income.  This study concluded 
that 43 percent of consumers spent the extra cash flow from the withholding change.  
This figure is similar to Campbell and Mankiw’s (1989) estimate, based on aggregate 
time-series that 50 percent of income goes to “rule of thumb” consumers.  Consistent 
with the 2001 evidence, the study revealed no relationship between the response to the 
withholding change and indicators of liquidity constraint based on one’s income and 
financial condition in the current year compared to the previous year and expectations 
about the next year.  Shapiro and Slemrod speculated that the results might be consistent 
with consumers following some sort of rule of thumb, or near-rational, behavior.  The 
evidence that this paper presents on budget targeting does suggest that budget rules  30
matter, although if “target spending” means that saving is the residual in a rule of thumb, 
this evidence does not support the simplest behavioral model. 
Although the 1992 and current surveys are similar in wording and design, the 
policy changes were different.  We have already emphasized that the 1992 policy change 
affected only the timing of tax payments while the 2001 change, if taken at face value, 
had a substantial effect on their present value.  The 2001 changes also might have been 
more salient.  They were more heavily discussed in the press and also came in the form of 
a single check rather than a series of 10 monthly increments to take-home pay.  It is not 
obvious, however, that increased salience would generate a higher rate of saving.   
 
V.  Conclusions 
Only 22 percent of households report that they had spent or expected to mostly spend the 
income tax rebate of 2001.  This spending rate perhaps needs to be corrected upwards by 
as much as 3 percentage points to account for the effect on survey responses of the timing 
of receipt of the rebate.  Given that the tax legislation in place at the time of the survey 
provided for ten years of tax cuts of at least the amount of the rebate for most households 
receiving the rebate, the tax rebate apparently corresponds to a substantial increment to 
lifetime resources.  Hence, standard economic theory would suggest a spending rate close 
to one.  It is therefore very surprising to find a spending propensity much closer to zero, a 
surprise that is compounded by the likelihood that some households are liquidity 
constrained, which raises the propensity to consume even out of a temporary tax cut.  
The very low propensity to consume is even more surprising in the context of 
previous estimates.  There is substantial evidence—both from aggregate time series and 
from data on households—that the propensity to consume out of changes in income is  31
substantial.  Indeed, the propensity to spend in situations where an unconstrained, 
forward-looking consumer would smooth consumption is generally found to be 
substantially larger than what we find. 
Economists are, of course, skeptical of survey responses.  We are supposed to be 
interested in what people do, not what they say they will do or have done.  We have 
argued elsewhere [Shapiro and Slemrod (1995)] that this view of the survey evidence is 
too limited.  In any case, it is very difficult to use time-series or cross-section evidence on 
actual behavior to study events such as the tax rebate.  It is a single event that affects 
most households by the same amount.  In the time series, any other aggregate event could 
account for changes in spending associated with the timing of the rebate.  In the cross 
section, most households will face the same shock.   
There are also legitimate concerns that the wording of the survey may affect the 
results in ways that are difficult to predict.  That our survey question has been tested in 
the field provides an important defense against these concerns.  In 1992, survey 
respondents reported a much higher spending rate for a temporary tax withholding 
change based on a nearly identical survey instrument.  These findings are in line with 
other evidence on the propensity to consume.  That survey respondents reported low 
propensities to consume from the 2001 rebate hence cannot therefore be attributed to the 
survey methodology. 
What accounts for the very low propensity to consume from the 2001 tax rebate?  
The cross-sectional analysis of Section III provides some clues.   Respondents are quite 
pessimistic about the size of future tax rebates.  Even among respondents with high and 
increasing income who should benefit substantially from the legislated reduction in  32
marginal tax rates, no more than a 1/3 expect to receive future tax cuts from the 2001 
legislation greater than the size of the rebate.  Many households who received the rebate 
expect to benefit in the future by less than the size of the rebate. 
Wealth holding is one of the most powerful predictors of spending propensity in 
the cross-section.  Those with some stockholdings, but low levels of stock-market wealth, 
are particularly likely to save the rebate.  This is consistent with a spender/saver model.  
Those without stock portfolios may be spenders.  Those with stock portfolios, but with a 
low value of stock, may be in saving mode as they try to build assets.  Those with high 
asset values may already have adequate accumulated saving.  Moreover, they tend to be 
high-income households for whom the size of the rebate is relatively small.   
The cross-section results also fail to support some possible theories of the low 
propensity to spend.  In particular, because we find that propensity to spend the tax cut is 
not associated with expectations of lower government spending, the cross-section results 
do not support the Barro/Ricardo integration of the household and government budget 
constraints. 
There are, of course, limitations to the cross-sectional results.  First, because the 
vast majority of households do not spend the rebate, there is little cross-section variation 
in behavior to explain.  It is not thus surprising that the R-squared statistics reported in 
Tables 11, 12, and 13 are fairly low.  Second, and more fundamentally, if there is an 
aggregate change in behavior such that spending propensities have shifted downward, 
cross-section techniques will be of limited use in pinpointing it.  The survey does indicate 
that there is a high degree of aggregate pessimism about the size of future tax cuts and the 
possibility that government spending will be restrained.  These findings can explain a low  33
spending propensity on average even if there is not sufficient variation in these beliefs to 
predict which of the few households will actually spend their rebate. 
Regardless of the reasons for the low rate of spending, the findings of this paper 
have significant implications for the impact of fiscal policy on the economy.  First, the 
low propensity to consume implies that the 2001 tax rebate will have a very small impact 
on aggregate demand.  The rebate was added to the 2001 tax bill explicitly to provide a 
short-run stimulus.  This research suggests that policymakers will be disappointed.  
Moreover, the new survey conducted after the terrorist attack suggests that further 
temporary tax cuts will be relatively ineffective in stimulating spending. 
Second, to the modest extent that spending from the rebate was spent, low-income 
households are not less likely to spend.  This finding runs counter to the belief that a tax 
rebate would be more effective at stimulating aggregate demand were it targeted at low-
income households.  It is, though, conceivable that the propensity to consume would be 
higher among those households whose income was too low to qualify for the first round 
of rebates.  This survey does not rule that possibility out. 
Third, our finding of a very low propensity to consume raises a cautionary note 
about the effectiveness of fiscal policy in general.  Consumer behavior appears to have 
shifted from what most economists would have expected, both based on economic theory 
and earlier evidence.  It is possible that key parameters such as the propensity to consume 
are contingent on aggregate conditions in ways that are difficult to anticipate or model.  
One can speculate about why the spending propensity might have shifted downward 
under the circumstances of mid-year 2001.  Perhaps the negative wealth shocks of the 
previous two years placed consumers in an asset-rebuilding mode.  There may be costs to  34
cutting back consumption, such as a force of habit.  Such preferences may cause 
households to allocate the rebate to saving even if they are saving a very low fraction of 
current income.  Future research may clarify the causes of the large apparent decline in 
the marginal propensity to consume.  In the meantime, these findings illustrate the peril 
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A31.  Earlier this year a Federal law was passed cutting income tax rates and 
expanding certain credits and deductions.  The tax cuts will be phased 
in over the next ten years.  This year many households will receive a 
tax rebate check in the mail. In most cases, the tax rebate will be 
$300 for single individuals and $600 for married couples. 
 
Thinking about your (family’s) financial situation this year, will the 
tax rebate lead you mostly to increase spending, mostly to increase 
saving, or mostly to pay off debt? 
 
1. INCREASE 
   SPENDING 
 2.  INCREASE 
   SAVING 
  3. PAY OFF 
   DEBT 
  6. (IF VOLUNTEER) 
   WILL NOT GET REBATE 
 8.  DON’T 
   KNOW 
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
 
        GO TO A33    GO TO A38    GO TO A33 
 
 
A32.  Will the increase in spending be for a particular item that you 
otherwise would not have purchased, or will it be spent mostly on day-
to-day expenses?  
 




A33.  (Have you/Has your family) already received your tax rebate? 
 
1. YES    2. (IF VOLUNTEER) 
   YES, SOME DID/SOME DIDN’T 
  5. NO    8. DON’T KNOW 
    ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓                    ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓            GO TO A35 
 
 
A34.  Was the tax rebate check received within the last week, more than a 
week ago but within the last four weeks, or more than four weeks ago? 
 
1. WITHIN 
   LAST WEEK 
  2. MORE THAN WEEK 
   AGO, BUT WITHIN 
   LAST FOUR WEEKS 
  3. MORE THAN FOUR 
   WEEKS AGO 
 8.  DON’T 
   KNOW 
 
 A35.  INTERVIEWER CHECKPOINT: 
          
   1. WILL SPEND REBATE (A31=1) --> GO TO A36 
       
   2. ALL OTHERS --> GO TO A37  




A36.  When do you plan on spending most of your tax rebate--have you already 
spent most of it, will you spend most of it within a month, will you 
spend most of it within two months, will you spend most of it before 
the end of the year, or will you not spend most of it until next year? 
 
1. ALREADY 
   SPENT 
 2.  WITHIN 
   MONTH 
  3. WITHIN  
   2 MONTHS 
  4. BY END 
   OF YEAR 
 5.  NEXT 
   YEAR 
 8.  DON’T 




A37.  Now thinking about the tax cuts you (and your family) expect in future 
years, do you think that your (family’s) annual tax cut will be larger 
than this year’s tax rebate, about the same size, or smaller than this 
year’s tax rebate? 
 
1. LARGER THAN 
   REBATE 
 3.  SAME 
   SIZE 
  5. SMALLER THAN  
   REBATE 
 8.  DON’T 




A38.  Do you have a (family) budget, or otherwise plan, your spending and 
saving? 
 
1. YES    5. NO    8. DON’T KNOW 
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓    GO TO A40    ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
 
 
A39.  People budget in different ways.  Do you (and your family) generally 
try to keep your spending within a certain limit or do you focus more 
on trying to save regular amounts of money, or to pay off regular 
amounts of debt? 
 
(CHECK ALL THAT APPLY —- DO NOT PROBE FOR ADDITIONAL MENTIONS) 
 
A. SPEND 
   WITHIN 
   LIMIT 
 B.  SAVE 
   REGULAR 
   AMOUNTS 
  C. PAY OFF 
   REGULAR 
   AMOUNTS 
   OF DEBT 
  D. (IF VOLUNTEERED) 
   DOESN’T BUDGET/ 
   BUDGETS IN 
   DIFFERENT WAY 
 Z.  DON’T 






A40.  If (you/your family) had an unexpected expense, such as a one-time car 
repair, would you pay for it mostly by taking the money out of savings, 




   SAVINGS 
  2. CUT BACK ON 
   OTHER SPENDING 
  3. USE CREDIT 
   OR BORROWING 
 8.  DON’T 




A41.  Do you think the tax rebates will improve conditions in the national 
economy during the year ahead, will the tax rebates worsen conditions 
in the national economy during the year ahead, or will the tax rebates 
not have much impact on the national economy during the year ahead? 
 
1. IMPROVE 
   ECONOMY 
 5.  WORSEN 
   ECONOMY 
  6. NOT HAVE 
   MUCH IMPACT 
 8.  DON’T 




A42.  Now thinking about the federal tax cut legislation as a whole, not just 
this year’s rebate, do you think the tax cuts will lead to increased 
future government spending, decreased future government spending, or 
will future government spending not change much as a result of the 
federal tax cut? 
 
1. INCREASED 
   SPENDING 
 5.  DECREASED 
   SPENDING 
 6.  SPENDING 
   NOT CHANGE 
 8.  DON’T 




A43.  Thinking of your (family’s) financial situation over the next ten 
years, do you think the tax cut legislation will make you better off 
financially, make you worse off financially, or will it not make much 
difference to your financial situation? 
 
1. BETTER OFF 
   FINANCIALLY 
  5. WORSE OFF 
   FINANCIALLY 
  6. NOT MAKE 
   MUCH DIFFERENCE 
 8.  DON’T 
   KNOW 
 
 Final data: August , September, and October Pooled Results 
[Revised Nov 14, 2001] 
 
Table 1—Plans To Spend or Save Rebate? 
 
 
Note: The first row gives unweighted responses.  The second row gives weighted responses (rounded to nearest whole number).  Columns A 
through F give number of responses.  Column G gives the number in column B divided by the sum of the numbers in column B through D.  
Percentages based on unrounded responses. 
 















  Unweighted 1506 267 423 563 204 49 21.3%
  Weighted 1444 256 376 544 223 45 21.8%Table 2—Spend or Save Rebate?  Responses by Income and Wealth 
 
 
Note:  Tabulations based on weighted responses with “don’t know” and “refused” excluded.  Column A gives the frequency of response by rows.  
Columns B through E give number of  weighted responses (rounded to nearest whole number).  Column F gives the number of responses in 
Column B divided by the sum of  responses in Columns B, C, and D.  Column G gives the p-value for the hypothesis that the spend percentages 
in Column F are equal.  Percentages and p-values based on unrounded responses. 
 
 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)












0 to 20,000 20.4% 23 27 81 132 17.6%
20,001 to 35,000 20.1% 42 74 109 35 18.8%
35,001 to 50,000 17.9% 40 74 103 14 18.6% 0.076
50,001 to 75,000 18.8% 63 66 105 10 27.0%
More than 75,000 22.9% 69 95 123 9 24.1%
Stock
No stock 51.1% 109 150 275 182 20.4%
1 to 15,000 9.3% 15 33 70 11 12.8%
15,001 to 50,000 11.0% 25 43 73 11 18.0% 0.004
50,001 to 100,000 8.6% 28 36 48 8 24.9%
100,000 to 250,000 12.1% 49 65 50 6 29.8%
More than 250,000 7.8% 30 48 27 4 28.4%Table 3—Plans to Spend or Save Rebate 
 
A.  Responses by Financial Condition 
 
B.  Responses by Retrospective versus Expected Financial Condition 
 
Note:  Rows are condition this year compared to last year.  Columns are condition expected next year compared to this year.  First number is cells 
are percentage of respondents spending the rebate.  The second number is the frequency.  See also note to Table 2. 












Financial condition compared to last year
Better Now 41.3% 119 180 220 56 23.0%
Same 28.9% 82 110 129 81 25.6% 0.015
Worse 29.8% 55 85 189 85 16.6%
Financial condition expected next year
Better Off 39.3% 96 127 251 57 20.2%
Same 50.4% 133 190 227 131 24.3% 0.227
Worse Off 10.3% 22 41 52 25 19.4%
Income expected next year
Higher 59.2% 151 212 358 100 20.9%
Same 28.6% 79 105 116 96 26.4% 0.053
Lower 12.1% 25 56 63 24 17.2%
(A) (B) (C)
Financial Condition Next Year
Better Same Worse
Financial Condition This Year
  Better 23.3% 23.3% 22.0%
258 282 34
  Same 19.9% 31.8% 14.4%
101 244 50
  Worse 16.0% 15.7% 22.4%
181 175 61Table 4—Spend or Save Rebate:  Responses by Budgeting 
 
 
Note:  See note to Table 2.  Multiple mentions are allowed for the budget targets, so the responses are not mutually exclusive.  The budget target 
question also allowed, though did not prompt for, budgeting other ways.  Seven respondents (weighted) gave this reply.   
 













Yes 65.6% 175 236 373 129 22.3% 0.555
No 34.4% 81 139 168 91 20.8%
If budget, Target spending
Yes 50.8% 95 123 166 75 24.7% 0.077
No 49.2% 76 109 207 53 19.5%
If budget, Target saving
Yes 39.0% 75 123 121 33 23.5% 0.426
No 61.0% 96 109 251 95 21.1%
If budget, Target debt repayment
Yes 43.6% 64 70 208 51 18.7% 0.043
No 56.4% 107 162 164 77 24.8%
If budget, Target saving or debt repayment
Yes 68.2% 111 155 273 77 20.6% 0.128
No 31.8% 60 77 100 50 25.5%
How to pay for unexpected expense
Use Savings 50.7% 158 243 209 82 25.9%
Cut Back Spending 27.0% 52 79 167 71 17.4% 0.001
Use Credit 22.4% 39 49 159 59 15.7%Table 5—Spend or Save Rebate?  Response by Outlook for Economy and Policy 
 
 
Note:  See note to Table 2. 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)











Size of future tax cuts
Larger 16.1% 40 43 92 NA 22.9%
Same Size 47.1% 103 167 241 NA 20.1% 0.703
Smaller 36.8% 86 131 182 NA 21.6%
Impact of tax cuts on personal finances 
over next 10 years
Better Off 23.1% 78 94 122 22 26.5%
No Change 72.0% 156 261 385 182 19.5% 0.022
W o r s e  O f f 5 . 0 % 1 61 32 91 1 2 7 . 8 %
Impact of tax cut on economy next year
Improve Economy 27.2% 86 110 127 45 26.7%
Not Much Impact 62.9% 132 228 357 134 18.5% 0.003
Worsen Economy 9.9% 30 26 54 23 27.5%
Impact of tax cut on government spending
Increased Spending 26.1% 68 89 137 49 23.0%
Spending Not Change 54.7% 126 185 294 114 20.9% 0.700
Decreased Spending 19.3% 51 82 90 30 22.9%Table 6—Expected Future Tax Cut and Spending of Rebate: 




Note—The table show expectations of size of future tax cuts and fraction spending the rebate by income 
groups and expectations of future financial condition.  The first three rows of each cell show the fraction 
expecting a larger, same, or lower tax cut.  The fourth row shows the fraction spending the rebate.  The 




Income Better Off Same Worse Off
0 to 20,000 Fraction: Larger Tax Cut 0.21 0.02 0.18
Fraction: Same Tax Cut 0.44 0.60 0.26
Fraction: Smaller Tax Cut 0.36 0.38 0.56
Spending Fraction 13.5% 15.8% 50.0%
Frequency 88 145 30
20,001 to 35,000 Fraction: Larger Tax Cut 0.18 0.08 0.05
Fraction: Same Tax Cut 0.59 0.45 0.42
Fraction: Smaller Tax Cut 0.23 0.47 0.53
Spending Fraction 15.9% 22.3% 7.8%
Frequency 94 141 19
35,001 to 50,000 Fraction: Larger Tax Cut 0.26 0.14 0.14
Fraction: Same Tax Cut 0.44 0.56 0.26
Fraction: Smaller Tax Cut 0.30 0.31 0.60
Spending Fraction 13.4% 26.3% 10.8%
Frequency 98 103 30
50,001 to 75,000 Fraction: Larger Tax Cut 0.19 0.11 0.05
Fraction: Same Tax Cut 0.55 0.49 0.59
Fraction: Smaller Tax Cut 0.26 0.40 0.36
Spending Fraction 27.7% 27.9% 25.3%
Frequency 112 113 22
More than 75,000 Fraction: Larger Tax Cut 0.31 0.18 0.26
Fraction: Same Tax Cut 0.39 0.43 0.36
Fraction: Smaller Tax Cut 0.30 0.40 0.38
Spending Fraction 23.8% 26.5% 17.2%
Frequency 122 143 35
Financial Condition Next Year 
Table 7—Plans for Spending Rebate 
 
 
Note:  Tabulations based on weighted responses with “don’t know” and “refused” excluded.  Column A gives the frequency of response.  Column 




Spend rebate on what
Particular Item 39.8% 100
Day-to-Day Expense 60.2% 151
When spend rebate
Already Spent 54.6% 133
Within Month 21.6% 52
Within 2 Months 7.0% 17
By End of Year 13.6% 33
Next Year 3.2% 8Table 8—Spend or Save Rebate?   
 
A.  Response by Timing of Survey Response or Receipt of Rebate 
 
 
B.  Response by Timing of Survey versus Receipt of Rebate 
 
Note:  In panel B, the first number is cells are percentage of respondents spending the rebate and the second number is the frequency.  See also 
note to Table 2.   
 












Timing of Survey Response
Before attack 49.6% 106 198 272 117 18.4% 0.005
After attack 50.4% 150 178 271 106 25.1%
When Received Rebate
Not yet 40.8% 78 161 236 NA 16.4%
Within last week 7.7% 26 27 36 NA 29.2% 0.001
1-4 weeks ago 24.0% 63 91 126 NA 22.5%
More than 4 weeks ago 27.5% 89 92 140 NA 27.6%
(A) (B)
No Yes
Timing of Survey Response
  August 17.3% 22.6%
296 100
  September 13.4% 22.3%
145 266
  October 19.4% 29.2%
54 344
Received Rebate YetAugust September October Final Pooled Results 
Updated Nov 13, 2001 
 
Table 9—Regression Analysis of Spending Rebate:   
Timing of Survey and Timing of Receipt of Rebate 
 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Timing of survey: 
   After attack  0.067    0.019  0.012     
 (0.025)**    (0.041)  (0.041)     
  September    0.006  -0.003  -0.029  -0.025   
    (0.029) (0.035) (0.037) (0.031)   
  October    0.092  0.073  0.036  0.045   
   (0.032)**  (0.052)  (0.056)  (0.036)   
Received Rebate: 
  Last week        0.130     
      (0.053)*    
  1-4 weeks ago        0.050     
      (0.035)    
  More than 4 weeks ago        0.084     
      (0.037)*    
Received  Rebate       0.079  0.093 
       (0.028)**  (0.025)** 
Constant  0.184 0.185 0.185 0.166 0.166 0.164 
  (0.017)** (0.021)** (0.021)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.018)** 
Observations  1200 1200 1200 1187 1187 1187 
R-squared  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 
 
Note:  Estimates are linear probability regression with the dependent variable equal to one if the tax rebate is spent and 
zero if it is saved or used to repay debt.  Estimates are based on weighted data.  Heteroskedastic-consistent standard 
errors are in parentheses.  A * indicates significant at the 5% level; a ** indicates significant at the 1% level.  See 
Appendix Table 1 for definitions and means of dependent variables. Table 10—Regression Analysis of Spending Rebate:  Covariates 
 
 (A)  (B) 
Log income  0.028  0.023 
 (0.023)  (0.022) 
Stock    1 to 15,000  -0.072  -0.072 
 (0.039)  (0.038) 
             15,001 to 50,000  -0.031  -0.035 
 (0.042)  (0.041) 
             50,001 to 100,000  0.028  0.024 
 (0.050)  (0.050) 
             100,000 to 250,000  0.054  0.051 
 (0.047)  (0.046) 
             More than 250,000  0.030  0.028 
 (0.057)  (0.056) 
Married 0.043  0.040 
 (0.032)  (0.030) 
Children -0.018   
 (0.032)   
Age 30 to 39  0.053  0.050 
 (0.042)  (0.041) 
Age 40 to 49  0.078  0.077 
 (0.043)  (0.042) 
Age 50 to 64  0.028  0.034 
 (0.042)  (0.041) 
Age 65 and over  0.124  0.132 
 (0.054)*  (0.053)* 
High School Graduate  0.007   
 (0.065)   
Some College  -0.003   
 (0.065)   
College Graduate and beyond  -0.020   
 (0.065)   
September -0.023  -0.024 
 (0.032)  (0.032) 
October 0.043  0.042 
 (0.038)  (0.038) 
Received Rebate  0.075  0.075 
 (0.030)*  (0.030)* 
Constant -0.202  -0.163 
 (0.233)  (0.225) 
Observations 1059  1059 
R-squared 0.04  0.04 
 
Note:  See Table 9. 
 
  
Table 11—Regression Analysis of Spending Rebate:  Financial Condition 
 
 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D) 
Log  income  0.018 0.026 0.021 0.023 
  (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
Stock    1 to 15,000  -0.071  -0.077  -0.078  -0.073 
  (0.039)  (0.038)* (0.039)* (0.038) 
             15,001 to 50,000  -0.037  -0.034  -0.037  -0.029 
  (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) 
             50,001 to 100,000  0.024  0.025  0.025  0.024 
  (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) 
             100,000 to 250,000  0.053  0.054  0.056  0.056 
  (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) 
             More than 250,000  0.037  0.021  0.030  0.034 
  (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) 
Married  0.040 0.036 0.037 0.045 
  (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) 
Age 30 to 39  0.055  0.050  0.055  0.045 
  (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) 
Age 40 to 49  0.084  0.080  0.088  0.072 
  (0.042)* (0.043)  (0.043)* (0.042) 
Age 50 to 64  0.039  0.039  0.045  0.033 
  (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) 
Age 65 and over  0.134  0.142  0.146  0.130 
  (0.055)* (0.057)* (0.058)* (0.055)* 
September  -0.019 -0.024 -0.018 -0.026 
  (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
October  0.048 0.039 0.045 0.037 
  (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
Received  Rebate  0.071 0.076 0.072 0.073 
  (0.030)* (0.030)* (0.030)* (0.030)* 
Financial condition compared to last year: 
   Better now  0.071    0.072   
  (0.030)*   (0.031)*  
   Same  0.065    0.069   
  (0.036)   (0.037)  
Financial condition expected next year: 
   Better off    0.023  0.021   
   (0.046)  (0.046)   
   Same    0.045  0.036   
   (0.045)  (0.046)   
Expected income: 
   Higher        0.057 
      (0.041) 
   Same        0.079 
      (0.047) 
Constant  -0.166 -0.223 -0.225 -0.218 
  (0.229) (0.243) (0.242) (0.234) 
Observations  1056 1030 1028 1051 
R-squared  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
Note:  See Table 9. 
 Table 12—Regression Analysis of Spending Rebate:  Budgeting 
 
 (A)  (B)  (C) 
Log  income  0.027 0.037 0.019 
  (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) 
Stock    1 to 15,000  -0.074  -0.045  -0.071 
  (0.038) (0.049) (0.039) 
             15,001 to 50,000  -0.037  -0.042  -0.040 
  (0.041) (0.048) (0.041) 
             50,001 to 100,000  0.027  0.085  0.016 
  (0.050) (0.065) (0.049) 
             100,000 to 250,000  0.048  0.040  0.039 
  (0.046) (0.057) (0.046) 
             More than 250,000  0.028  -0.020  0.016 
  (0.057) (0.072) (0.057) 
Married  0.038 0.036 0.035 
  (0.030) (0.038) (0.030) 
Age 30 to 39  0.045  0.045  0.052 
  (0.041) (0.051) (0.041) 
Age 40 to 49  0.075  0.065  0.086 
  (0.043) (0.052) (0.043)* 
Age 50 to 64  0.031  0.016  0.041 
  (0.041) (0.051) (0.041) 
Age 65 and over  0.135  0.190  0.128 
 (0.053)*  (0.071)**  (0.054)* 
September  -0.022 -0.008 -0.024 
  (0.032) (0.042) (0.033) 
October  0.043 0.047 0.034 
  (0.038) (0.047) (0.038) 
Received  Rebate  0.075 0.098 0.072 
 (0.030)*  (0.036)**  (0.030)* 
Has budget  0.034     
 (0.028)     
Targets spending    0.045   
   (0.035)   
Targets saving    0.014   
   (0.035)   
Targets debt payment    -0.036   
   (0.035)   
Use savings for unexpected expense      0.054 
     (0.032) 
Use credit for unexpected expense      -0.034 
     (0.036) 
Constant  -0.218 -0.329 -0.128 
  (0.228) (0.268) (0.227) 
Observations 1057  701  1043 
R-squared  0.05 0.06 0.05 
 
Note:  See Table 9.  For equations with budget targets, “targets other” is the excluded category. 
 Table 13—Regression Analysis of Spending Rebate:  Outlook for Economy and Policy 
 
 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D) 
Log  income  0.018 0.017  0.025 0.014 
  (0.023) (0.022)  (0.022) (0.024) 
Stock    1 to 15,000  -0.080  -0.073  -0.071  -0.067 
 (0.037)*  (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.040) 
             15,001 to 50,000  -0.027  -0.019  -0.033  -0.036 
  (0.042) (0.042)  (0.041) (0.041) 
             50,001 to 100,000  0.033  0.031  0.017  0.021 
  (0.050) (0.050)  (0.049) (0.050) 
             100,000 to 250,000  0.076  0.063  0.055  0.064 
  (0.049) (0.046)  (0.047) (0.047) 
             More than 250,000  0.031  0.032  0.017  0.044 
  (0.058) (0.057)  (0.056) (0.058) 
Married  0.037 0.036  0.042 0.044 
  (0.031) (0.030)  (0.030) (0.031) 
Age 30 to 39  0.043  0.044  0.035  0.051 
  (0.042) (0.041)  (0.041) (0.042) 
Age 40 to 49  0.084  0.072  0.074  0.075 
  (0.044) (0.042)  (0.043) (0.043) 
Age 50 to 64  0.039  0.029  0.034  0.027 
  (0.042) (0.041)  (0.041) (0.042) 
Age 65 and over  0.140  0.139  0.125  0.127 
  (0.055)* (0.054)** (0.054)* (0.056)* 
September  -0.014 -0.025  -0.033 -0.026 
  (0.033) (0.033)  (0.033) (0.033) 
October  0.041 0.034  0.036 0.045 
  (0.039) (0.038)  (0.038) (0.039) 
Received  Rebate  0.070 0.072  0.076 0.066 
  (0.031)* (0.030)*  (0.030)* (0.030)* 
Future tax cuts larger  0.035       
 (0.039)       
Future tax cuts smaller  0.018       
 (0.030)       
Tax cuts improve own situation    0.068     
   (0.031)*     
Tax cuts worsen own situation    0.092     
   (0.073)     
Tax cuts improve economy      0.068   
     (0.031)*   
Tax cuts worsen economy      0.098   
     (0.051)   
Tax cuts decrease government spending        0.012 
       (0.033) 
Tax cuts increase government spending        0.016 
       (0.035) 
Constant  -0.132 -0.116  -0.200 -0.067 
  (0.228) (0.227)  (0.226) (0.248) 
Observations 983  1042  1040  1015 
R-squared  0.05 0.05  0.05 0.04 
 
See note to Table 9. 
  Appendix Table 1—Means of Covariates in Regressions 
 
Independent variables  mean 
Log income  10.79 
Married .61 
Children .39 
Age 30 to 39  .25 
Age 40 to 49  .24 
Age 50 to 64  .24 
Age 65 and over  .13 
High School Graduate  .23 
Some College  .24 
College Graduate and beyond   .47 
September .34 
October .33 
Received Rebate  .60 
Observations 1059 
 
Note—Means of covariates in estimates from Table 9, Column (A).  Log income is log of household income.  All 
variables are zero, one dummies:  Married is 1 if the respondent is married.  Children is 1 if there are children under 18 
in the household.  The age and education dummies are 1 if the respondent falls in the respective age and education 
ranges.  The College Graduate and beyond categories includes those with more than 16 years of schooling.  September 
and October are dummies for survey response in those months (August excluded category).  Received rebate is 1 for 
households who had received the rebate at the time of the survey. 
 
 